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THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
SWALLOWS THE RULE: FLORIDA V. WHITE
Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999)
I. INTRODUCTION
In lorida v. White, the United States Supreme Court held
that the warrantless seizure of an automobile did not violate the
Fourth Amendment where that automobile, which had been
used in the commission of a drug offense two months before
the seizure, was defined as seizable contraband under Florida
state law.!
White continues the Supreme Court's long-term expansion
of the so-called "automobile exception," a category of searches
and seizures that involves cars and other vehicles in increasingly
tangential ways.2 This exception originally was grounded in the
notion that evidence in a stopped vehicle created an exigency
that made the warrant process infeasible.3 The Court has since
expanded the exception to cases involving mobile homes4 and
now in circumstances where probable cause developed months
before seizure. s
This Note illustrates that the automobile exception has in-
creasingly diverged from Fourth Amendment precedent. It also
demonstrates that cases relying upon the automobile exception
have become divorced from the Fourth Amendment's purpose:
protecting individuals from abusive governmental intrusions.6
When compared to recent cases, White is an apparently small
and innocuous step in increasing police power. This Note,
however, argues that White and its progeny are part of a disturb-
'Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999).
'Lewis R. Katz, The Automobile Exception Transformed: The Rise of a Public Place Exemp-
tion to the Warrant Requirement, 36 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 375, 376 (1986).
' See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
'California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985).
' Whit 119 S. Ct. at 1557-58.
'James A. Adams, The Supreme Court's Improbable Justifications for Restriction of Citi-
zens'Fourth Amendment Privacy Expectations in Automobiles, 47 DRAIE L. REV. 833, 833-34
(1999).
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ing long-term trend of eliminating the Fourth Amendment's.7
warrant requirement. Finally, this Note contends that it would
behoove the Court to recall that the automobile exception is an
exception to the warrant requirement and not the rule itself.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It was added to the Constitution as a means to protect individual
liberties from governmental abuses.9 The Framers of the Con-
stitution were extremely concerned about the general warrants
and warrantless searches that were part of the colonial regime.'0
By drafting a requirement for individualized warrants, the
Framers hoped to prevent the privacy invasions inherent in
general warrants and warrantless searches. It is generally ac-
cepted that the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" clause
condones certain warrantless searches and seizures." The Court
has held, however, that warrantless searches and seizures are per
se unreasonable. 2
' SeeKatz, supra note 2.
'U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
'Adams, supra note 6. See also Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969) (not-
ing that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement was part of a reaction to war-
rantless searches and general warrants).
°Chimel 395 U.S. at 761.
"Adams, supra note 6, at 836. See also Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 1561 n.2
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. United States Dist. Court for
Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 315-18 (1972) (noting that warrantless seizures
and searches may be reasonable); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55
(1971); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967);Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting), overruled in part by Chime 395 U.S. 752; Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S.
345, 348 (1972); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963)).
" Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (citations omitted).
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B. THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
1. The Exception is Born: Carroll
The "automobile exception" originated in 1925 with Carroll
v. United States.' The exception affords decreased Fourth
Amendment protections for searches and seizures connected to
cars. In Carroll the police had reason to believe that a car flee-
ing pursuit contained contraband alcohol.' 4 The officers pulled
over the car, searched it without a warrant, and found sixty-eight
bottles of illegal alcohol.'5 The Court held that the officers did
not need a warrant, so long as they had probable cause to sus-
pect that the car contained contraband.' 6 The Court rational-
ized its decision through two closely linked analyses.
First, the Court explored the nature of search and seizure
law at the time of the Fourth Amendment's ratification.'7 The
Court concluded that:
[C]ontemporaneously with the adoption of the Fourth Amendment we
find in the first Congress, and in the following Second and Fourth Con-
gresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant be-
tween goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or
similar place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed
in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a
search warrant.18
Thus, the Court used the Framers' intent to create an exception
to the warrant requirement in cases where the item searched
was highly mobile.
Second, the Court found the distinction between mobile
and stationary contraband containers to be pragmatic.' 9 The
historical record supported the idea that courts' and legisla-
" Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Some types of automobile excep-
tion cases pertain to situations not relevant to White This Note does not discuss those
situations or cases, including searches incident to traffic stops, see, e.g., Knowles v.
Iowa, 119 S. Ct. 484 (1998); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), and the
rights of a passenger involved in the warrantless search of a car, see, e.g., Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997).








tures' construction of the Fourth Amendment had always dis-
tinguished between mobile and immobile items. 0 For example,
the Court noted that courts and legislatures have distinguished
between searches of stores or houses and searches of boats,
wagons, or cars. Vehicles may create a situation "where it is
not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.,22 In Carroll, the defendants were flee-
ing pursuit. That pursuit, and the concomitant possibility of de-
stroyed evidence, created an exigency which made a warrantless
search necessary.3 The Court therefore held that a warrantless
search or seizure might be necessary where contraband would
otherwise be moved beyond the reach of the law.24
The progeny of Carroll primarily relied on one or both of
two automobile characteristics to justify warrantless searches
and seizures: mobility and publicness. Courts initially ap-
proached the automobile exception with the presumption that
warrantless searches and seizures were "per se unreasonable. 6
Subsequently, the requirements have become increasingly leni-
ent.
2. Mobility as a Rationale for the Automobile Exception
The first important expansion on the Carroll doctrine of
mobility occurred in Chambers v. Maroney, 8 which held that
automobiles are inherently mobile.2 In that case, two armed
2 Id. at 154-56.
, Id at 153.
2 Id.
1Id at 153.
' SeeFlorida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 1559-60 (1999) (upholding warrantless sei-
zure because car was mobile and public); Adams, supra note 6, at 839 (describing ra-
tionalizations under the automobile exception as addressing either mobility or a
diminished expectation of privacy); Katz, supra note 2, at 379 n.13 (categorizing
automobile exception rationalizations as addressing mobility, diminished expectation
of privacy, and impracticability of obtaining a warrant due to mobility).
26 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) ("[Slearches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unrea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.").
' Adams, supra note 6, at 834.




individuals robbed a service station and fled in their car.30 Po-
lice stopped a car matching the description given by service sta-
tion attendants and arrested the defendants.3' The officers
seized the car without a warrant. 2 After bringing the vehicle to
the police station, the officers conducted a warrantless search of
the car and found two guns, which they later used as evidence.3
Although the car was no longer mobile, the Court used the
car's potential mobility as a rationale to uphold the warrantless
search.3 4  The court first noted that under Carrol's probable
cause requirement, a warrantless search would have been con-
stitutional at the time the car was stopped.s The search would
have been justified because the defendants were fleeing pursuit
and because evidence would have disappeared without an im-
mediate search3 6 The potential loss of evidence created an exi-
gency justifying a warrantless search.37  Essentially without
explanation, the Court contended that the later search at the
police station was also justifiable because of a potential loss of
evidence .3  The Court noted that the mobility of the car "still
obtained at the station house," as did probable cause. 9 The
Court upheld the search, finding a warrantless search more
practical and desirable than detainment of the car while officers
sought a warrant.4 0  Thus, the car itself somehow remained
"mobile" for constitutional purposes in spite of the fact that it
was in police custody.41 This reasoning contrasts with Carroll,42 in










, The Court also based its reasoning on the idea that searches and seizures are ap-
proximately equal in terms of their invasiveness. Id. However, the Court has held
that searches (which invade a privacy interest) are actually more intrusive than sei-
zures (which invade a property interest). See Katz, supra note 2, at 391 (citing Segura
v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 806 (1984)); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14 n.8 (1977); United States v. Van
Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252 (1970)).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20001
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which it was clear that a car (and therefore evidence) would
have disappeared if officers had not conducted an immediate
search.
The Court declined to expand the mobility rationale for
warrantless searches and seizures in United States v. Chadwick."3
In Chadwick, the Court refused to extend the automobile excep-
tion to the warrantless search of a footlocker in the locked trunk
of a car." In stark contrast to later cases, the Court noted that:
[n] o less than one who locks the doors of his home against intruders,
one who safeguards his personal possessions in this manner is due the
protection of the Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause. There being no
exigency, it was unreasonable for the Government to conduct this search.... 45
without the safeguards ajudicial warrant provides.
Only a few years later, the Court overruled Chadwick in
United States v. Ross, in which the majority held that a car's mo-
bility could sustain the warrantless search of a closed container
within the locked trunk of a car.46 In support of the mobility ra-
tionale, the Court relied heavily on Carrolls historical explora-
tion of the mobility issue.4 ' The Ross Court said that "since its
earliest days Congress had recognized the impracticability of se-
curing a warrant in cases involving the transportation of contra-
band goods.48  The Court's interpretation of Carroll was that
"the nature of an automobile in transit" justified a warrantless
search.49 Since both the trunk in Ross and the alcohol in Carroll
were in transit, the Court found them equally searchable. 0 The
Court concluded that disallowing container searches would de-
feat the purpose of Carroll, saying, "the practical consequences
of the Carroll decision would be largely nullified if the permissi-
ble scope of a warrantless search of an automobile did not in-
' 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977).
' Id. See also Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (holding that party's
Fourth Amendment rights were violated when, in the context of a traffic stop, police
searched without a warrant opaque plastic containers sitting in the locked trunk of a
car).
4' Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11.
" United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982).
" Id. at 804-09 (citing Carrol 267 U.S. at 132).
* Id. at 806.
9 Id at 806-07.
'o Id at 820.
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clude the containers and packages found inside the vehicle."5
Ross, then, reinvoked Carroll and expanded the automobile ex-
ception to closed containers within vehicles.
In California v. Carney, the Court expanded the mobility ra-
tionale to include the warrantless search of mobile homes. In
justification, the Court relied both on mobility and on a privacy
rationale.53 Citing earlier cases that used the mobility rationale,
the Court stated that "the vehicle is obviously readily mobile by
the turn of an ignition key, if not actually moving .... [T]he
overriding social interests in effective law enforcement justify an
immediate search before the vehicle and its occupants become
unavailable."51 Carney, then, expanded the automobile excep-
tion in a manner that began to threaten the home, a location
formerly afforded a very high level of Fourth Amendment pro-
tection. In the end, Carney further removed the automobile
exception from situations in which a car's mobility created a
genuine possibility of lost evidence.
In addition to Carney, the Court decided two other automo-
bile cases during the 1985 term. One case, Oklahoma v. Castle-
berry, affirmed a lower court's decision without opinion.56 The
lower court determined that officers needed a warrant to search
containers that they had probable cause to believe contained
contraband before being placed in a car. The most similar
case, Ross, was distinguishable because in Ross probable cause
focused on the car itself, rather than on an item inside the car.58
During the 1985 term, the Court also decided United States
v. Johns.59 In Johns, Customs officers observed suspicious behav-
ior by individuals driving pickup trucks.6° The officials ap-
proached the trucks and noticed bales that smelled of
marijuana. They then arrested the drivers and seized the
I1./d.
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
Id. at 390-94.
"Id. at 393.
See Katz, supra note 2, at 380.
Oklahoma v. Castleberry, 471 U.S. 146 (1985).
Castleberry v. State, 678 P.2d 720 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 806 (1982).





trucks, which they took to DEA headquarters. 62 Three days
later, officials searched the truck without a warrant and found
marijuana.6' The Supreme Court held that the delay between
the development of probable cause and a warrantless search was
not necessarily unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.Y
Most recently, the Court in Pennsylvania v. Labron held that
a car's mobility is by itself a sufficient exigency to permit a war-
rantless search or seizure.6 Labron is quite similar to earlier
cases relying on inherent mobility to rationalize warrantless
searches and seizures. The case is noteworthy, however, as it is
the first case to hold explicitly that inherent mobility is by itself
a sufficient exigency for a warrantless search or seizure.6 While
Chambers discussed inherent mobility, it retained the fiction that
a car in custody could theoretically disappear with evidence.
Labron, in contrast, is entirely divorced from any practical con-
siderations.r The Court made a car's potential mobility the
lynchpin of its argument while leaving behind pragmatic argu-
ments that caused earlier Courts to discuss that nature.
Thus, from its limited beginnings in Carrolt9 in the 1970s,
the mobility rationale for the automobile exception has ex-
panded dramatically.
3. Diminished Privacy Expectations as a Rationale for the Automobile
Exception
In recent years, the Supreme Court has also upheld warrant-
less automobile searches and seizures by explaining that auto-
mobiles involve a diminished expectation of privacy. The Court
has used either or both of two explanations to support this idea:
that cars are public, and their contents are therefore in public
view; or that cars are heavily regulated, leading owners to expect
greater government intrusion.
62 Id at 481.
Id- at 484.
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996).
Id
6 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
Labron, 518 U.S. at 939-41.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977) (citing Cardwell v. Lewis, 417
U.S. 583, 590 (1974); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973); South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976)).
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A series of cases in the mid-1970s used the privacy rationale
to uphold warrantless searches and seizures. In Cady v. Dom-
browski,71 the Court addressed a case in which officers looked for
a gun in a truck being removing from an accident scene and
discovered other incriminating evidence.2 The truck in ques-
tion was wrecked and thus clearly immobile.78 The Court there-
fore could not argue that the truck was mobile, so it instead
used a different explanation: the diminished privacy created
through ubiquitous regulation of vehicles. 74 In support, the ma-
jority stated that "[a]ll States require vehicles to be registered
and operators to be licensed."7 5 The extensive vehicle regula-
tions passed by most states and localities thus reduced owners'
privacy expectations regarding their vehicles. 76 The Court con-
trasted the high level of regulation on automobiles with what it
perceived as lesser regulation on areas such as homes or busi-
nesses.7 Cars' frequent location in public view also could di-
minish privacy expectations, according to the Court.
78
United States v. Chadwick lent additional weight to the dimin-
ished expectations rationale.79 The Court endorsed the plurality
in a 1974 case, which said, "[o]ne has a lesser expectation of
privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation
and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of
personal effects... it travels public thoroughfares where both
its occupants and its contents are in plain view."8° The Court
also looked to the frequency of government intervention as a
source of lessened privacy expectations.8' While cases cited in
Chadwick had mentioned diminished privacy expectations in
" 413 U.S. 433 (1973).







433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977).
Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). Because it was a plu-
rality opinion, this case had little impact on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence until
it was endorsed in Chadwick.
SId. at 13 (citing Cady v. Dembrowsky, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (holding that
government regulation of vehicles creates lessened expectation of privacy); South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (holding that government inspections
of vehicles may create lessened expectation of privacy)).
20001 925
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passing, Chadwick made it an important component of the
812
automobile exception.
For a time after Chadwick, diminished privacy expectations
were abandoned as an explanation for the automobile excep-
tion.3 In 1985, however, United States v. Carney reinvoked dimin-
ished privacy expectations as part of its rationale for warrantless
searches."' Carney involved the warrantless search of a mobile
home, which the court ruled was, in fact, mobile enough to in-
voke the automobile exception."' Carney united for the first
time the mobility and diminished privacy expectation rationales
for the automobile exception, stating that "the lesser expecta-
tion of privacy resulting from its use as a mobile vehicle justified
,,86th Cor
application of the vehicular exception. Oddly, the Court
cited Ross for the reduced privacy rationale, although Ross relied
only on mobility to uphold a warrantless search. Carney her-
alded a shift in the law that combined the diminished privacy
rationale and the mobility rationale into a single "exigency."
Since that "exigency" relied solely on the nature of cars, it po-
tentially eliminated the need for warrants in any circumstance
involving anything that could be considered a vehicle.
4. The Circuit Split: Cars as Seizable Contraband
Before White, federal circuits split on the handling of war-
rantless vehicle seizures under civil forfeiture statutes. The
cases each addressed one of two federal forfeiture acts.88
The majority of circuits addressing the issue have upheld as
constitutional warrantless seizures of cars where civil forfeiture
" Chadwick's discussion of car owners' diminished privacy expectations was dictum.
It has, however, been widely cited and is an important foundation for subsequent
cases.
See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985).
"Id
8"Id
See 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1993); Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 9 U.L.A. § 505
(1993). A majority of state courts that have addressed similar state forfeiture laws
have upheld them. See, eg., State v. White, 680 So. 2d 550, 554 (Fla. Dist. App. Ct.
1996) (citing State v. Brickhouse, 20 Kan. App. 2d 495 (Kan. 1995); State v. McFad-
den, 63 Wash. App. 441 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991), rev. denied 119 Wash. 2d 1002 (Wash.
1992); Lowery v. Nelson, 43 Wash. App. 747 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986), rev. denied, 106
Wash. 2d 1013 (Wash. 1986); cf., Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178 (Utah 1991)).
926 [Vol. 90
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laws defined the seized cars as contraband.89 The Eleventh Cir-
cuit, part of the majority, addressed warrantless car seizures un-
der civil forfeiture statutes in United States v. Valdes.90
Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit made no reference to the
automobile exception. 1 Instead, the court justified the warrant-
less seizure of an automobile used in drug trafficking as analo-
gous to a warrantless arrest.9 2 The court justified this analogy by
noting that a person's liberty interest against arrest is greater
than her property interest against seizure. 3 If an officer can ar-
rest a drug dealer without a warrant, the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded, it should be even easier for that officer to seize the drug
dealer's car without a warrant.
94
The Seventh Circuit upheld the warrantless seizure of vehi-
cles used for criminal purposes in United States v. Pace.95 In Pace,
96officers seized without a warrant the car of suspected assassins.
The court cited several grounds for upholding the officers' war-
rantless seizure, including the fact that several other circuits had
upheld such seizures. The court also cited such seizures' his-
torical acceptability98 and noted that "under a civil forfeiture
statute, 'the vehicle ... is treated as being itself guilty of wrong-
doing." '99 The court then echoed Valdes, stating that the war-
rantless seizure of a forfeitable automobile is analogous to an
' State v. White, 680 So. 2d at 553 (citing United States v. Decker, 19 F.3d 287 (6th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Val-
des, 876 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-
Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397 (4th
Cir. 1982); United States v. Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981)). White further notes
that three circuits have overturned warrantless seizures of automobiles as contraband
under civil forfeiture acts. Id. (citing United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080 (10th Cir.
1993); United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
$149,442.43 in United States Currency, 965 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Linn, 880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989)).




Pace, 898 F.2d at 1218.
SId.
Id. at 1241 (citing cases).
"Id.




arrest.'0 Since an arrest under probable cause required no war-
rant, the court reasoned that none was necessary to seize a for-
feitable automobile.0 1
The Sixth Circuit indirectly addressed the issue of warrant-
less seizures under civil forfeiture acts in United States v. Decker
02
In Decker, the defendant protested the use of material gained in
an inventory search by the FBI.0 3 The federal officers re-
sponded that the search was valid because the vehicle was for-
feitable as contraband.' °4  The Sixth Circuit upheld the
inventory search because the officers had probable cause to be-
lieve the car's contents were forfeitable.05 Since the case did
not directly address forfeiture statutes, it is not directly on• 106 i a
point. Decker is relevant, however, because it was cited in
White.
In United States v. One 1977 Lincoln V Coupe, a case remarka-
bly similar to White, the Third Circuit held that probable cause
to seize a vehicle under a forfeiture statute did not grow stale af-
ter two months.10 7 The Third Circuit noted that two months
"does not present a very long or completely unexplained delay
between the occurrence of events giving rise to probable cause
and the seizure."'" The court declined to decide whether prob-
able cause could ever become stale.'o'
Similarly, in United States v. Kemp, the Fourth Circuit upheld
a warrantless seizure that occurred months after police had
probable cause to search a car.1" ° After probable cause devel-
oped, officers did not search for the car for two months."'
Upon finding the car, officers promptly seized it without a war-
rant."2 Kemp distinguished between searches and seizures, not-
1®Id.
101 Id.
19 F.3d 287 (1994).




"' United States v. One 1977 Lincoln V Coupe, 643 F.2d 154 (3rd Cir. 1981), cert.
denied 454 U.S. 818 (1981).10 Ic





ing that seizures have a lower threshold of reasonableness than
searches. The court used the lower standard because warrant-
less seizures do not violate an individual's privacy interest, but
only her property interest.
11 4
In United States v. One 1978 Mercedez Benz,"5 the Fifth Circuit
adopted Kemp's holding that warrantless seizures are more likely
to be reasonable than warrantless searches. This case, too, up-
held the warrantless seizure of a car under a civil forfeiture stat-
ute."6 The Fifth Circuit added that the owner automatically
forfeited the car to the government when he or she used the car
illegally." 7 Thus, by seizing the car, government agents were
merely taking property that already belonged to the govern-
ment.18 Government agents did not, therefore, need a warrant
for such a seizure." 9 The court also found that "the statute did
not place any exigent circumstances requirement on the war-
rantless seizure.' Finally, the court held that the civil forfei-
ture statute stipulated no time constraints for seizures of
forfeitable vehicles. 2'
In United States v. Bush, the Third Circuit also upheld the
warrantless seizure of a car under a civil forfeiture act. 22 The
Third Circuit justified its opinion through a literalist reading of
a civil forfeiture statute.123 The court stated that "[o]n its face
... [the statute] would appear to have authorized the warrant-
less seizure of the automobile, notwithstanding the absence of
any exigency.', 24 The court therefore upheld the seizure and
chose to disregard any other circumstances in the case.'25
In contrast, three circuits have overturned warrantless sei-
zures of cars that were forfeitable as contraband under civil
statutes. In United States v. Spetz, the Ninth Circuit held that
13 Id. at 401.
114 &
... 711 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir. 1983).
556 IR
.. Id at 1302.
519 a
"' Id.
.. Id. at 1302.






such warrantless seizures are unconstitutional.2 6  The court
noted that "a forfeiture seizure must nevertheless comport with
the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, because 'no Act of
Congress can authorize a violation of the Constitution."'127 The
court noted that past courts have ruled that warrantless searches
and seizures are per se unreasonable.128 Assuming the per se un-
reasonableness of the seizure, the court concluded that the gov-
ernment had acted unconstitutionally.'2 Thus, a civil forfeiture
act upheld in other circuits was imbued with a warrant require-
ment (absent exigent circumstances) in the Ninth Circuit.
The Second Circuit in United States v. Lasanta also held that
federal forfeiture statutes do not negate the warrant require-
ment for searches and seizures.3 In Lasanta, the government
attempted to justify its seizure by referring to the forfeiture stat-
ute's plain language, which did not mandate a warrant.3 2 In re-
sponse, the court asserted that the government's suggested
reading of the statute was unacceptable because it would write
the warrant requirement out of the Constitution. The Third
Circuit also worried that a literal reading of the statute would
remove judges from the search and seizure process. In over-
turning the seizure, the court commented that "it would, in-
deed, be a Pyrrhic victory for the country, if the government's
relentless and imaginative use of that weapon were to leave the
constitution itself a casualty.
13 5
Finally, in United States v. Dixon, the Tenth Circuit over-
turned the warrantless seizure of a car under a federal civil for-
feiture statute.3 6  The Court noted that it aligned itself with
courts that found warrantless seizures of cars under civil forfei-
ture laws unconstitutional.
1 37
"° United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1470 (9th Cir. 1983).









" United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080 (10th Cir. 1993).
- I at 1083.
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In sum, the majority of courts had upheld warrantless sei-
zures under civil forfeiture statutes, while the minority read a
warrant requirement into such statutes.
5. The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
The Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act,'-" the statute rele-
vant in White, was enacted in 1974. The state legislature has
since amended the statute several times. 9 The statute's struc-
ture is extremely similar to the structure of federal civil forfei-
ture statutes. 40 In relevant part, the Florida statute states that,
"[a] ny contraband article used in violation of any provision of
the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means
of which any violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act
has taken or is taking place, may be seized and shall be for-
feited."'' The statute also "authorizes law enforcement agencies
to seize vehicles 'of any kind' used 'to facilitate the transporta-
don, carriage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession,
purchase, sale, barter, exchange, or giving away of any contra-
band article. 42 Courts have interpreted this section of the Act
to mean that law enforcement may seize vehicles used in co-
caine sales. The Act does not require a warrant for seizures of
vehicles that qualify as contraband.'"
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In June andJuly of 1993, Florida police observed and video-
taped Respondent Tyvessel Tyvorus White delivering and selling
" Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 932.701-932.707 (West
1993).
'"White v. State, 710 So. 2d 950, 955 (Fla. 1998).
'- 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1993); Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 9 U.LA. § 505
(1993).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703(1) (a).
,42 Id. § 932.703(1) (b).
'State v. White, 680 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 932.701(2) (a)5, 032.702(3) (West 1993); id. § 932.701(2) (a) 1; L STAT.
ANN. § 893.03(2) (a)4 (West 1993)).
'" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 932.703(2) (a) ("Personal property may be seized at the time
of the violation or subsequent to the violation, provided that the person entitled to
notice is notified... that there is a right to a [sic] adversarial preliminary hearing.").
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cocaine. White used his car to make his deliveries, but the po-
lice did not arrest or detain him at that time.4  Months later, on
October 14, 1993, White was arrested at work on unrelated
charges.4 7 While he was in custody, officers seized White's car
as contraband under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act.
4 1
The police did not obtain a warrant for the seizure, because
they believed the car to be contraband under the Act due to its
prior involvement in drug-related activity.
4 9
After the seizure, police searched the vehicle and discov-
ered two pieces of crack cocaine in a paper bag in the car's ash-
tray. 50 As a result, police charged White with possession of a
controlled substance under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture
Act.151
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
At trial, White moved to suppress as evidence the crack
found in his car, stating that the officers found the cocaine after
they unconstitutionally seized the car without a warrant.'-5 The
court still permitted that evidence to go to the jury 53 After the
jury found White guilty, White moved again to suppress the in-
clusion of the crack cocaine as evidence.' The court denied
the motion to suppress, and White appealed the court's de-
nial.'5
On appeal, the First District of Florida affirmed the lower
court's opinion.' The court held that under the Forfeiture
Act, "the seizing agency is required only to have probable cause
to believe that the property sought to be seized [was used] in
White, 680 So. 2d at 551.
146 I&
"' Brief for Petitioner at 4, Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999) (No. 98-223).
r Id. at 5.
'~'Id. at 2.
" Id. at 4.
12 State v. White, 680 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1996).
153 Id.
ii d
" Id. White also appealed the admission of certain statements he made before re-
ceiving a Miranda warning, id at 555, but that issue is was not argued before the Su-
preme Court.
" I& at 551.
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violation of the Forfeiture Act (citations omitted) .,,s7 The court
did not find it relevant that police lacked probable cause to be-
lieve that the car contained contraband or was being used in
violation of the Act at the time of seizure.158
The court then asked whether the Act itself was unconstitu-
tional because it allowed warrantless seizures.159 In deciding that
the Act was constitutional, the court referred to the Act's strong
similarities to a federal forfeiture statute and the Uniform Con-
trolled Substances Act.16° In support, the court noted that a plu-
rality of federal courts have found that federal civil forfeiture
statutes do not violate the Fourth Amendment and "that evi-
dence obtained in a subsequent inventory search is admissible
in a criminal prosecution." 1 The court also cited state courts
that upheld warrantless searches or seizures under state civil for-
feiture laws.'62  In explanation, the Florida court quoted the
Eleventh Circuit, which said "[i]f federal law enforcement
agents armed with probable cause, can arrest a drug trafficker
without repairing to the magistrate for a warrant, we see no rea-
son why they should not also be permitted to seize the vehicle
the trafficker has been using to transport his drugs.1 63  The
Florida court also noted that automobiles traditionally receive
fewer Fourth Amendment protections than most property, and
a warrant was therefore less necessary.' 64 One member of the
threejudge panel dissented, siding with the minority of courts




,6, Id. (citing United States v. Decker, 19 F.3d 287 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pace, 898 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Valdes, 876 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir.
1989); United States v. One 1978 Mercedes Benz, Four-Door Sedan, 711 F.2d 1297
(5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Bush, 647 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1981)); but see United States v. Dixon, 1 F.3d 1080 (10th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v.
$148,442.43 in United States Currency, 965 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Linn, 880 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1989)).
"' Id. at 554 (quoting State v. McFadden, 820 P.2d 53, 57 (Wash. App. 1992) (cit-
ing Lowery v. Nelson, 719 P.2d 594 (Wash. App. 1986), rev. denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1013
(1986); State v. Brickhouse, 890 P.2d 353 (1995); cf. Davis v. State, 813 P.2d 1178
(Utah 1991))).
Id. (quoting Valdes, 876 F.2d at 1559-60).
"'Id. at 554 (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390 (1985)).
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stances, to be an unacceptable intrusion on Fourth Amendment
Rights.'
The Florida appellate court, however, did note that neither
the Florida Supreme Court nor the United States Supreme
Court had addressed the constitutionality of warrantless
searches or seizures under civil forfeiture statutes." They
therefore certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question
of "whether the warrantless seizure of a motor vehicle under the
Florida Forfeiture Act (absent other exigent circumstances) vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
so as to render evidence seized in a subsequent inventory search
of the vehicle inadmissible in a criminal prosecution.'
1 67
On February 26, 1998, a four-judge majority of the Florida
Supreme Court answered the appellate court's question affirma-
tively, holding that the warrantless seizure of White's car was
unconstitutional.10 The court first focused on the First District's
application of the automobile exception to the case, acknowl-
edging that the mobility and (sometimes) publicness of cars
lessen concerns about warrantless searches and seizures.6 9 Still,
the court believed that the existence of exigent circumstances
were an important component of constitutional warrantless
searches.17 ° The majority agreed with the minority of federal
circuits that "no language in the fourth amendment suggest[s]
that the right of the people to be secure in their 'persons,
houses, papers, and effects' applies to all searches and seizures
except civil-forfeiture seizures in drug cases.'' The Florida
court stated that upholding the constitutionality of this warrant-
less seizure would amount to allowing the legislature to rewrite
the Fourth Amendment and thus usurp the judiciary's role in
constitutional construction.72
The court found United States v. Lasant 73 to be a powerful
analogy.74 In that case, the Second Circuit found unconstitu-
' Id- at 557.
'd- at 555.
167 Id.
' White v. State, 710 So. 2d 949, 950 (Fla. 1998).
- Id. at 952.
1,0 Id.
"' Id. at 951 n.4 (quoting United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (1992)).tm Id.
" 978 F.2d 1300 (1992).
.. White, 710 So. 2d at 953.
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tional the seizure of a car parked in appellant's driveway, where
agents had surveilled the vehicle for months, and where seizure
occurred while the appellant slept. 5 The Second Circuit re-
fused to uphold the Lasanta seizure, and the Florida court
found the seizure of White's car to be equally unacceptable. 6
The Florida court next noted that it had upheld the Con-
traband Act's constitutionality in Department of Law Enforcement v.
Real Property. In Law Enforcement, however, the court predi-
cated its decision on the imposition of "numerous restrictions
and safeguards on the use of the act in order to protect a citi-
zen's property from arbitrary action by the government., 178 The
government's actions in White were "the very antithesis of the
cautious procedure we mandated" in Law Enforcement.79  The
court rejected the idea that the government could use the Con-
traband Act to seize property without a warrant under any cir-
cumstances, so long as the government believed that property
had once been involved in a crime."'O
The majority also declined to follow the lower court's anal-
ogy to the warrantless seizure of a person (i.e., arrest), noting
that an extension of this analogy to seizures of property would
make any property seizable without a warrant.18  The majority
quashed the lower court opinion and remanded for further
proceedings. 181
Disagreeing with the majority, two dissenting justices com-
mented on the majority's failure to recognize holdings of the
majority of circuits and several state courts cited by the appellate
court. 18 Further, they argued that the Forfeiture Act.had been
upheld for twenty-three years and that some of the searches and
seizures upheld under the Act were similar to White.184
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
on the question of "whether the Fourth Amendment requires
" Id. at 952 (citing Lasanta, 978 F.2d at 1305).
... Id. at 954.
'" Id at 952 (citing Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d
957 (Fla. 1991) (upholding constitutionality of Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act)).
I& (citing Law Enforcement, 588 So. 2d at 961).t mId.
ITM !d.






the police to obtain a warrant before seizing an automobile
from a public place when they have probable cause to believe
that it is forfeitable contraband."'1
IV. SUMMARY OF OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The United States Supreme Court reversed the finding of
the Florida Supreme Court, holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment does not require "the police to obtain a warrant before
seizing an automobile from a public place when they have
probable cause to believe that it is forfeitable contraband."'8 6 In
its decision, the Court relied largely on evidence of the Found-
ers' intent in writing the Fourth Amendment.
8 7
Justice Thomas first expressed the need "to inquire whether
the action was regarded as an unlawful search and seizure when
the Amendment was framed..'. Citing Carroll, the Court noted
that early Congresses passed laws authorizing the seizure of
goods found on ships after warrantless searches.'8 9 The majority
also cited Carroll for the proposition that the Court and Con-
gresses "have always recognized a greater need for warrants for
searches of homes or businesses than for searches or seizures of
mobile goods or vehicles."90 The Court criticized the Florida
Court's distinction between a search based on belief that it con-
tained contraband and a seizure based on a belief that the item
was once used in an illegal activity. 91 The seizure of White's car,
the majority asserted, was based on the fact that the car itself
was contraband under the Forfeiture Act rather than any belief
about its contents.92 Further, the court noted, early statutes al-
lowed the warrantless seizures of both goods and the vehicles
concealing those goods.
"5 Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 1557 (1999) (Thomas,J.).
"' Id. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer, and Chief Justice
Rehnquistjoined in the opinion.
17 Id. at 1558-59.
' Id at 1558.
19 Id.
"' Id at 1559 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151 (1925)).
191 Id.
1'9 Id
" Id. (citing, eg., 1 Stat. 43, 46; 1 Stat. 170, 174; 1 Stat. 677, 678, 692).
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The opinion also emphasized the fact that the car sat in a
semi-public space, noting that "[o]ur Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence has consistently accorded law enforcement officials
greater latitude in exercising their duties in public places."' 94
The Court drew an analogy to their decision in G.M. Leasing
Corp. v. United States, in which federal agents seized automobiles
without a warrant but were found not to have violated the
Fourth Amendment, in part because the cars were seized from a
public space. 19 Since White's car was also in a public space, the
court determined that no invasion of respondent's privacy oc-
curred and therefore no warrant was necessary.196
Notably, the majority explicitly declined to decide whether
probable cause could grow stale during the two months between
police observation of White and the seizure of his car. 97
B. JUSTICE SOUTER'S CONCURRENCE
Justice Souter authored a very brief concurrence, joined by
Justice Breyer, expressing concern about the floodgate effect
that White could spur.'98 Theyjoined the majority "subject to a
qualification against reading our holding as a general endorse-
ment of warrantless seizures of anything a State chooses to call
'contraband." ' 19 Justice Souter expressed concerned that legis-
latures appeared to be using the word contraband as a means to
avoid the warrant requirement."°  Under White, a legislature
might use an expansive statutory definition of seizable contra-
band to make the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement the
exception, rather than the rule. The Justices therefore condi-
tioned their concurrence on the reservation that state legisla-
" Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980); United States v. Wat-
son, 423 U.S. 411, 416-24 (1976)).
'" Id. (citing G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977)). The
Background section does not address this case because the case does not rely upon
the automobile exception. Instead, it relies upon prior tax cases in which federal
agents were able to seize property located in public.
"' Id. The dissent took issue with this analogy, noting that a previous tax assess-
ment on the vehicles in question caused the petitioners to have lost possessory inter-
est, as well as privacy interest in the vehicles. Id. at 1562 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In contrast, no one contended that White lacked a property interest in his car until
the seizure occurred.
Id. at 1559 n.4.





tures were not to interpret the decision in White to mean that
anything deemed contraband could be seized without a war-
rant."' Thus, Justices Souter and Breyer were comfortable with
the basic holding of White but were concerned that it would
open floodgates that could make warrantless seizures the norm.
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' DISSENT
In dissent, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, ex-
panded upon Justices Souter and Breyer's concerns."°2 While
the majority declined to discuss the delay between the develop-
ment of probable cause and the car's seizure, Justice Stevens
expressed grave concern about the two month delay.0 3 The dis-
sent noted that it was once "settled law" that warrantless
searches and seizures were per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. °4 According to the dissent, the Fourth Amend-
ment required those defending a warrantless search or seizure
to demonstrate that the exigencies of the situation made a war-
rant infeasible. They expressed concern that the Court did
not a'ply the presumption of per se unreasonableness in White's
case.
Justice Stevens argued that White indicated that "the excep-
tions have all but swallowed the general rule" that warrantless
searches and seizures are per se unreasonable.0 7 He found little
comfort in the majority's supporting cases, noting that:
searches of automobiles for contraband or temporary seizures of auto-
mobiles to effect such searches... are weak support for a warrantless
seizure of the vehicle itself, months after the property was proverbially
tainted by its physical proximity to the drug trade, and while the owner is
safely in police custody.
2 08
" Id. (SouterJ., concurring).
1d. (Stevens,J., dissenting).
I d. at 1562 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissenters also noted that if a warrant
had been obtained at the time officers saw the vehicle being used for illegal acts, the
two month delay still may have posed Constitutional problems. Id. at 1563 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
Id. at 1561 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 453-55 (1992)).
Id. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 453).
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).




As the majority expressed, the importance of the automo-
bile exception has always hinged on the danger implicit in the
vehicle's mobility. The dissenters, however, argued that this
exigency was nonexistent in White2 9 Given the absence of any
exigency, they believed that the warrant process' protections
from governmental abuse outweighed any inconvenience to law
enforcement.1 They noted that "no serious fear for officer
safety or loss of evidence can be asserted in this case. 2 '
Lastly, the dissenters focused on the importance of inserting
a neutral adjudicatory power into the process of governmental
seizure. They commented that "the State's treatment of cer-
tain vehicles as 'contraband' based on past use provides an
added reason for insisting on an appraisal of the evidence by a
neutral magistrate, rather than a justification for expanding the
discretionary authority of the police." The dissenters believed
that upholding a warrantless seizure and subsequent search
where police only had reason to believe that the vehicle had
been used illegally in the past would expand police power too
broadly.214 Since police often sell seized property, the dissenters
argued that police had a "pecuniary interest" to expand their
powers as much as possible. That pecuniary interest made the
interjection of a neutral magistrate all the more important in a
case such as White s.
6
In sum, the dissenters "would not permit bare convenience
to overcome our established preference for the warrant process
as a check against arbitrary intrusions by law enforcement agen-
cies 'engaged in the often competiive'-and, here, potentially
lucrative-'enterprise of ferreting out crime.' ' 217  Concerned
about the erosion of individuals' right to a warrant, the dissent
reasoned that the police in White had sacrificed individual liber-
ties for the sake of convenience.
Id. at 1561 (Stevens,J., dissenting).





Id. at 1562 (StevensJ, dissenting).
Id. at 1563 (StevensJ, dissenting).




This Note argues that, although the Court decided White
consistently with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, it
is not faithful to the sources of the automobile exception 218 A
return to the sources of the automobile exception would restore
clarity to the law and help to prevent governmental abuses in-
vited by Fourth Amendment exceptions.
A. WHITEFOLLOWS THE CURRENT TREND IN FOURTH
AMENDMENTJURISPRUDENCE
This Note argues that the Supreme Court came to an incor-
rect and unsound conclusion in White. White is, however, a logi-
cal extension of other recent Fourth Amendment cases.
Courts seldom place limits any longer on searches and sei-
zures under the automobile exception. 9 Instead, judges use
judicial deference to police officials as justification to permit
greater latitude by the police.220 The new latitude granted to po-
lice in White, therefore, is unsurprising, as it closely followed re-
cent precedent.
221
First, White followed the two most common rationales used
in automobile exception cases in the last twenty years: that vehi-
cles create diminished privacy expectations and that cars are
"inherently mobile. 222 Although the inherent mobility rationale
was muted in White (unlike previous cases, White never used the
words "inherently mobile"), the Court clearly cites cases that
address the issue explicitly, such as Carn 2 3 and Opperman.224
Instead of addressing inherent mobility, the Court asserted that
"[r] ecognition of the need to seize readily movable contraband
before it is spirited away undoubtedly underlies the early federal
laws relied upon in Carroll. , 225 White's car, however, was not po-
"' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132 (1925).
"' See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985).
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 338 n.6 (Ind. 1999) (explaining the
Court's trend towards expansion of the automobile exception since Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)).
" See, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 386.
' Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555, 1558 (1999).
Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-94.
"'South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559 (citing Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 122, 150-52
(1925)); see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297, 1303 (1999) (the Court's
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tentially or actually mobile, since police had both White and his
car keys in custody.226 "Ready mobility," then, appears to be a
proxy term for "inherent mobility." In cases addressing inher-
ent mobility, as in White, the likelihood that the car actually will
move is irrelevant.27 The Court grounded its ready mobility ar-
gument in the inherent mobility arguments of the past.
28
The second traditional rationale for permitting the warrant-
less search or seizure of automobiles is their publicness.2  The
Court also invoked this explanation in White.230 In lieu of de-
scribing automobile exception cases, the Court primarily cited
cases addressing other types of seizures in public places. 31 For
example, the Court cited the permissibility of public warrantless
arrests. 2 The Court also noted that "[i] t is also well settled that
objects such as weapons or contraband found in a public place
may be seized by the police without a warrant."23 3 The Court,
therefore, took a logical step by making publicly visible vehicles
seizable by defining them as contraband.234 While the concur-
rence and dissent made strong arguments explaining why the
decision was ill-advised, the seizure of public contraband with-
out a warrant was well-established.2 5 From the perspective of
recent precedent, therefore, the Court made a logical deci-
• 236
sion.
Interestingly, the Court chose to "express no opinion about
whether excessive delay prior to a seizure could render prob-
able cause stale, and the seizure therefore unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment., 237 The majority decided to ignore the
other 1999 automobile exception case that also uses the phrase "ready mobility" in
lieu of "inherent mobility").
White, 119 S. Ct. at 1557.
See, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 391.
White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559.
See, e.g., Carney, 471 U.S. at 390-94; United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12
(1977); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973).
119 S. CL at 1559.
"'United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416-24 (1976).
White; 119 S. CL at 1659 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586-87
(1980)). The dissent, however, distinguished the sole automobile-related case used
by the majority in their publicness argument. Id. at 1562 n.5 (StevensJ, dissenting).
"Id
See, e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 395 (1985).
m White, 119 S. CL at 1558.
' Id. at 1559 n.4.
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issue in spite of the fact that the respondent relied on staleness
at oral argument.38 The respondent argued that if police were
truly concerned about losing evidence, they would not have
waited two months to seize the car.23 9 Even a conservative read-
ing of the automobile exception would have allowed a warrant-
less seizure of White's car immediately after officers observed its
use in drug deals.
The issue of staleness, however, posed no threat to a war-
rantless search under current jurisprudence.240 The respon-
dent's argument that no exigency justified a warrantless seizure
was irrelevant, since no exigency need exist under the doctrine
of ready or inherent mobility. 24' The car by its nature is mobile,
and that is enough to allow a warrantless search or seizure un-
der the automobile exception.242 The argument begs the ques-
tion: what circumstances under White would officers need to
seek a warrant? The answer is that reasons are no longer neces-
sary for warrantless searches or seizures of automobiles to be
linked to crime, because the automobile exception to the war-
rant requirement arises from the automobile's inherent quali-
ties. Hence, it does not appear that any reason can restore the
requirement for a warrant.
Further, federal circuit courts indicate that under current
caselaw, there appears to be little problem with holding that a
two-month delay between probable cause and seizure is consti-
tutional.243 While declining to address delays longer than two
months, the Third Circuit has held that a two-month delay be-
tween probable cause and seizure is neither "a very long or
completely unexplained delay between the occurrence of events
giving rise to probable cause and the seizure."244 The Fourth
Circuit has explained that contraband under civil forfeiture acts
belongs to the government from the moment of its illegal use.
Any delay between probable cause and seizure is therefore
merely a delay in the government asserting an existing property
2
'9 Id
M I& at 1559.
"' California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985).
242 1
4 See, e.g., United States v. Kemp, 690 F.2d 397, 401 (4th Cir. 1982); United States
v. One 1977 Lincoln V. Coupe, 643 F.2d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied 454 U.S.
818 (1981).
244 Lincoln v. Coupe, 643 F.2d at 158.
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right. 5 The same could be said of White, where the car ostensi-
bly became contraband several months before officers seized
it." Thus, there is little reason to believe that, under current
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, probable cause could be-
come stale. The circuit courts have held that staleness is a non-
issue, and the Supreme Court declined to consider it as part of
the petitioner's argument in White. It seems, then, that the Su-
preme Court is unlikely to rule against officers who have waited
to search or seize a vehicle even long after probable cause has
developed.
The Supreme Court therefore was well within the con-
straints of current law in White. This does not, however, mean
that the decision was correct.
B. COURTS' USE OF W-HTE
Trial courts have alreadyr used White to continue expanding
the automobile exception. Commentators have expressed
concern over this additional diminution of the rights of prop-
erty owners.248 The "Pyrrhic victory" foreseen by the Second
Circuie--that the automobile exception will swallow the rule
that warranfless seizures and searches are per se unreasonable-
is approaching fruition.
A Texas Court of Appeals used White as ammunition to le-
gitimate the seizure and inventory search of a vehicle where the
vehicle was not contraband and where officers had no probable
cause to believe that the car contained any evidence. In La-
gaite v. Texas, police knew that the defendant, a murder suspect,
had driven a particular car to the scene of a murder.21 Based
on that knowledge, the police seized the defendant's car with-
out a warrant and searched it at the police station, revealing
"'Kemp, 690 F.2d at 401.
White, 119 S. Ct. at 1555.
2 4 See United States v. Zabala, 52 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Baldwin v.
Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 338 n.6 (Ind. 1999); Lagaite v. Texas, 995 S.W.2d 860, 866-
67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
" See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Warrant Requirement Takes Another Blow, TRIAL, July
1999, at 101 ("On May 17, the Supreme Court committed itself further to the propo-
sition that the warrant requirement is dead for outdoor searches and seizures.").
... United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1305 (2d Cir. 1992).




evidence vital to the defendant's conviction. 2 In upholding
Lagaite's conviction, the appellate court held that since police
had probable cause to believe the car had been involved in a
crime, they had probable cause to seize the vehicle.23 The
Texas court found the seizure lawful, concluding "that the po-
lice officers had probable cause to believe that appellant's white
Mustang, regardless of its contents, was used, albeit indirectly, in
the commission of the offense. '' 4 Since the defendant used the
vehicle in conjunction with the crime, "the need to seize and
preserve the vehicle is equally as important as the need to seize
contraband articulated in White."25 Again citing White, the court
held that Lagaite's car's public location also mitigated the need
for a warrant.
Remarkably, Lagaite contained no discussion of the car
owner's rights. Instead, the court addressed only the need of
law enforcement. Lagaite made even more tenuous the con-
nection to the exigencies that originally justified the automobile
exception2 8 Following White, the Texas court saw no need for
exigent circumstances to legitimate the warrantless seizure. It
was enough that the vehicle was in public and possibly linked to
a crime.2 " Taking the next step, the Texas court has for the first
time authorized seizure where there was no contraband, only a
vehicle's "indirect" involvement in a crime. r° The exigent cir-
cumstances that were so crucial to early automobile exception
cases have become irrelevant, leaving a rule that cars may be
seized based solely on the fact that they are connected to a
crime.
In United States v. Zabala, the Southern District of New York
used White to diminish the need for warrants no matter how
tangentially an automobile is involved.261 Invoking both White
2 5 3 Id,
' Id at 866-67 (citing Florida v. White, 119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999)).
-IR at 867.
' Id. at 866-67 (citing White, 119 S. Ct. at 1555).
57 Id.
'" See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
Lagaite, 995 S.W.2d at 866-67.
260 Id
2'2 United States v. Zabala, 52 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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and Wyoming v. Houghton,5 2 the court refused to suppress evi-
dence gained upon the arrest of two individuals where they
were transporting duffel bags from an apartment to a car.
The automobile exception was not dispositive of that case, since
the parties had given the officers permission to search the
trunk.26 The case is noteworthy, however, because it continued
the trend of recent Fourth Amendmentjurisprudence by stating
that "the automobile exception has been applied flexibly.",
29
Indeed, the exception's flexibility, in this case, only continued
to increase.
In Baldwin v. Reagan, the Indiana Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a law permitting traffic stops to check for
compliance with a seat belt law.2 6 The Indiana court cited White
as evidence that the Supreme Court is unwilling to constrain the
automobile exception. 167The court stated in a footnote that
"[iln nearly every case (one exception), the high court found
the police search at issue to be constitutional." Thus, it ap-
pears that courts are interpreting White as carte blanche to ap-
prove the inclusion of evidence found without a warrant, so
long as an automobile was somehow involved in the crime or
violation in question.
Lastly, in Grinberg v. Safir, the Supreme Court of New York
County, N.Y. used White to justify the seizure of a car used by a
man arrested for driving while intoxicated.26 9 Drawing an anal-
ogy to White's statutory construction, the trial court concluded
that a New York City Property Clerk Forfeiture Law270 did not
make a facial case for a warrant requirement.2 ' Citing White,
the court noted that "[n] o warrant was required to arrest peti-
tioner or to seize his car; no warrant was needed to validate his
... Wyoming v. Houghton, 119 S. Ct. 1297 (1999) (extending police powers to
search car passengers' belongings without a warrant in the context of a traffic stop).




"' Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 341 (Ind. 1999).
. Id. at 338 n.6.
I.
" Grinberg v. Safir, 694 N.Y.S.2d 316, 323 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999).
' NEWYORK, N.Y., ADMmsmTwTIE CODE § 14-140 (1995). It is worth mentioning
that this law, unlike Florida's Forfeiture Act or the federal civil forfeiture acts, does
not involve drugs.
2 Grinberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
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arrest and the car's retention."272 This case, like other post-White
vehicle seizure cases, is notable for the complete absence of any
discussion of the party's rightsY3 The same is true for the tradi-
tional Fourth Amendment concerns of property, privacy, and
exigency. In Grinberg, a court has extended the automobile ex-
ception to allow seizure for a new offense-driving while intoxi-
cated.274
Grinberg, like the other post-White automobile exception
cases, lends credence to Justice Souter's argument that the
States would read White as "a general endorsement of warrant-
less seizures of anything a State chooses to call 'contraband.' ' 275
It is significant that the New York City police commissioner
chose to enforce a civil forfeiture act on drunk drivers only a
month before the Supreme Court heard arguments on White.
State administrators and legislators will tailor policies geared to
White, thereby turning an exception to the warrant requirement
into the rule. The above cases make it clear that such strategies
succeed under White. Justice Souter's concern about strategic
legislative use of the word "contraband" to avoid the warrant re-
quirement has proved well-founded. 7
C. THE SOLUTION: A RETURN TO CARROLL AND KATZ
The weaknesses inherent in White are illustrated by the fact
that stale probable cause poses very little threat to warrantless
searches and seizures.278 These flaws indicate that the decision is
fundamentally unsound and dangerous. A true return to
Carrol's 279 requirement of exigent circumstances and Katz's 280 as-
sumption that warrantless searches and seizures are per se unrea-
sonable would better protect the requirements of the Fourth
Amendment and individuals' rights to property and privacy.
White appears to address original intent, yet ignores the




27 White, 119 S. Ct. at 1560.
" See G inberg, 694 N.Y.S.2d at 319.
27 White, 119 S. Ct. at 1560.
23119 S. Ct. 1555 (1999).
267 U.S. 132 (1925).
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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discusses at some length early laws that allowed warrantless
searches of ships and seizures of contraband,28 yet it ignores en-
tirely the Fourth Amendment's raison d'etre. While "[t]he focus
of the Fourth Amendment [was] to provide the people with
protection against government activity unsupported by judicial
involvement in the search process,"2 82 the Fourth Amendment's
warrant requirement has become an inconvenience that officers
are allowed to avoid under a wide variety of circumstances.
It is remarkable that White and its progeny, in dealing with
an amendment that speaks so strongly to the importance of pri-
vacy and property, made no reference to these rights. The cases
are essentially silent about these individual liberties. Instead,
White examined the details of early laws that allowed searches
and seizures without warrants under specialized circum-
283
stances. 8  Unfortunately, White's progeny have followed this
lead by ignoring individual liberties and rights. 84 Instead, they
discuss the needs of law enforcement.2  Such unbalanced dis-
cussions contrast sharply with the protective scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
Additionally, White was inconsistent in its holding. It did
not overrule Carroll2 86 and even cites that case approvingly as
the source of the automobile exception.287 Yet the Court agreed
with more modern cases that ignored Carroll's exigent circum-
stances requirement for warrantless searches and seizures.288 In
Carroll, a vehicle was readily mobile because it was fleeing police
pursuit.219 White, however, made the circular argument that a
vehicle was readily mobile because it was a vehicle.20 Even
though the Court cited Carroll as controlling precedent, the ma-
jority ignored the older case's spirit and context.
M' White, 119 S. Ct. at 1558.
Adams, supra note 6, at 833-34.
White, 119 S. Ct. 1555.
See, eg., United States v. Zabala, 52 F. Supp. 2d 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1999);
Baldwin v. Reagan, 715 N.E.2d 332, 338 n.6 (Ind. 1999); Lagaite v. Texas, 995 S.W.2d
860, 866-67 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999).
w See, e.g., Lagaite, 995 S.W.2d at 866-67.
Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559.
Carrol4 267 U.S. at 144.
Whit4 119 S. Ct. at 1159.
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It may be that such internal contradictions are simply a part
of "automobile exception" jurisprudence. In an earlier auto-
mobile exception case, Justice Powell noted that "the law of
search and seizure with respect to automobiles is intolerably
confusing. The Court apparently cannot agree even on what it
has held previously, let alone on how these cases should be de-
cided."291 Justice Brennan, in another case, excoriated the
Court for "adopt[ing] a fiction. ' 2 ChiefJustice Rehnquist him-
self once wryly noted that "the decisions of this Court dealing
with the constitutionality of warrantless searches, especially
when those searches are of vehicles, suggest that this branch of
the law is something less than a seamless web."293 In order to
untangle the web of automobile exception jurisprudence and to
remain true to Supreme Court precedent, the Court must ig-
nore recent cases such as White and return to Katz and Carroll.
In a true acknowledgment of Carroll, the Court would use
an accurate notion of ready mobility.24 A return to Carroll still
would allow the Court to acknowledge that exigent circum-
stances may require officers to forego a warrant in order to pre-
vent evidence from disappearing from the scene.0 5 Following
earlier precedent would not, however, create a blanket exemp-
tion from the warrant requirement where automobiles were in-
volved. Instead, the Court would examine the presence of
exigent circumstances and ask whether the officers had reason
to believe that the evidence would soon disappear. In White, the
answer would have been no, because White was in custody and
his car keys were in the hands of policeY6
Further, a return to the "exigent circumstances" require-
ment would give the Court incentive to address the staleness is-
sue ignored in White.27 From the Carroll perspective, it is clear
that staleness would weigh against any argument that exigent
circumstances existed. In Carroll, the fact that the defendants
were fleeing a search justified an invasion of their Fourth
"'Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 430 (1981).
'NewYorkv. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,466 (1981).
Cady v. Dembrowsky, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973).
White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559.
Carrol( 267 U.S. at 153-55.
White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559.
Id. at 1559 n.4.
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Amendment rights.28 In White, police officers were aware of the
location of the vehicle at varying points in a two-month period.
The officers' awareness would be convincing evidence that the
danger of the car's disappearance was not so great as to allow
foregoing a warrant.2 The case would be true to the Founders'
intent of allowing warrantless searches and seizures under re-
stricted circumstances,; °° but would avoid a meaningless blanket
exception.
Through a return to Katz,'"' another case the Court has not
yet disavowed, the Court would be forced to recall that warrant-
less searches are "per se unreasonable."0 2 Though exigent cir-
cumstances could create a situation allowing a warrantless
search or seizure, primary consideration would be given to the
rights of the individual.33" The Katz majority noted that "this
Court has never sustained a search upon the sole ground that
officers reasonably expected to find evidence of a particular
crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intru-
sive means consistent with that end."' 4 In White, such an ap-
proach would have the effect of heeding the dissenters' worries,
while (as the majority apparently wished) still considering the
fact that the Founders' wanted warrantless searches and seizures
to be possible.305
A return to Katz would also address the White dissenters'
concerns. Using statutory definitions of contraband to avoid
the warrant requirement would no longer be effective. A pre-
sumption of per se unreasonableness would ameliorate Justices
Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg's concerns about laws defining
contraband broadly.m Further, Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
would have no cause for concern about the police's pecuniary
interest in potentially seizable property.37 The per se unreason-
ableness of warrantless seizures would mean that neutral magis-
trates would be much more likely to intervene between the
'" CarrolY, 267 U.S. at 144.
" White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559.
See Carrol4 267 U.S. at 151.




White, 119 S. Ct. at 1559.
See id. at 1560 (SouterJ., concurring); id. at 1562 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
Id. at 1562-63 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
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individual and the State and to protect the property rights of
individuals.
Thus, a return to the law of Katz and Carroll would end the
trend of making the automobile exception the rule and return
it to a more reasonable status as an occasional exception. With-
out foregoing precedent entirely, the Court could restore mean-
ing to the Fourth Amendment in cases involving automobiles.
VI. CONCLUSION
The automobile exception, as it relies more on the charac-
ter of automobiles and less on the rights of individuals, is com-
ing close to swallowing the rule of the warrant requirement.
The Court has steadily expanded the exception, and it has be-
come more unwieldy over time. White is no exception to this
trend. The Court must treat the Fourth Amendment as a guar-
antee of individual liberties, not an inconvenience to law en-
forcement. By returning to the roots of the automobile
exception, the Court could both honor original intent and pro-
tect the rights of individuals.
Kendra Hillman Chilcoat
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